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Digital platforms have become a ubiquitous 
phenomenon and sparked innovation in various 
industries. However, digital platforms have also 
raised concerns about competition, privacy, labor 
protection, democracy, and negative externalities. 
This is why platform regulation has gained significant 
attention from research and practice in recent years. 
Regulators face the challenge of predicting the 
importance of a new platform of investigation with 
limited resources and a growing platform economy. 
To address this challenge, we develop a framework 
building on infrastructural properties, platform 
properties, and the notion of essentiality. We derive 
the concept of essential platform infrastructure to 
determine the need for regulation. We propose that the 
degree of essentiality of a digital platform and its 
appropriation of infrastructural properties are two 
dimensions indicating the magnitude of potential 
damage that a platform can cause in case it abuses its 





Digital platforms have become ubiquitous and 
prevail in various industries ranging from operating 
systems, e-commerce, and social media to the sharing 
economy, search engines, payment, booking, and 
many more [1]. Digital platforms have created an 
enormous economic surplus for consumers and 
businesses. Nonetheless, digital platforms have also 
raised concerns about competition, privacy, labor 
protection, democracy, and negative externalities [2-
7]. Although they have largely avoided regulation in 
the past, digital platforms have been increasingly 
scrutinized and penalized by regulators in the last 
years. For example, Google has been penalized for 
tying its comparison shopping service to its dominant 
search engine and demoting rivals in search results [8] 
as well as for abusing its Mobile Applications 
Distribution Agreement for enveloping mobile search 
and mobile browsers [9]. 
Against the backdrop of a significantly growing 
platform economy, limited regulatory resources (e.g., 
number of employees in general and technology 
experts in particular [10]), and increasing abuses of 
power, regulators need guidance to determine which 
platforms should be regulated and which they can 
leave out of consideration. This struggle is currently 
reflected in the EU Commission’s effort to develop the 
Digital Markets Act, in which it aims to define large, 
systemic online platforms to impose specific 
obligations on those “gatekeepers” [11]. 
Establishing, if not predicting, the importance of 
a new platform of investigation is a critical task for 
researchers and regulators [12]. To this end, we 
develop a framework comprising infrastructural 
properties, platform properties, and the notion of 
essentiality. Moreover, we propose the concept of 
essential platform infrastructure to derive the need for 
regulation. Our framework differentiates four types of 
platforms: (1) basic platforms, (2) essential platforms, 
(3) infrastructuralized platforms, and (4) essential, 
infrastructuralized platforms. The fourth type is what 
we term, for simplicity reasons, essential platform 
infrastructure and it represents digital platforms that 
are large in scale and scope (infrastructuralized), and 
perceived to compete against no viable alternative 
(essential). We discuss that the degree of essentiality 
of a digital platform and its appropriation of 
infrastructural properties are two dimensions 
indicating the magnitude of potential damage that a 
platform can cause in case it abuses its power. Hence, 
the more essential a digital platform becomes to users 
and the more it expands its scale and scope, the higher 
the need for regulation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 introduces the properties of 
infrastructures and digital platforms, reviews the 
notion of essentiality, and outlines the concepts of 
abuse of power and regulation. Section 3 theorizes the 
intersections of infrastructures, platforms, and 
essentiality to derive a framework for essential 
platform infrastructure. Section 4 discusses how the 
essentiality of a digital platform and its infrastructural 
properties can be employed to derive the need for 
regulation. Section 5 outlines the theoretical and 
practical implications of essential platform 





infrastructure. Section 6 presents avenues for future 
research. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical Primer 
2.1 Properties of Infrastructures 
Common metaphors present infrastructures as 
supporting layers or substructures, referring to the 
concept that infrastructures are a foundation on which 
something else runs or operates. In this sense, earlier 
infrastructures of the 19th century include roads, 
canals, water systems, railroads, and electric grids, 
whereas digital infrastructures of the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries comprise examples such as the 
Internet, data centers, and open standards (e.g., XML 
or TCP) [13-15]. Following Star and Ruhleder [16], 
we argue that such metaphors are not accurate. They 
assume that some things are per se infrastructures, 
whereas others are not. Opposing this view, we argue 
that infrastructure is a relational concept [17]. That is, 
things become infrastructure in relation to practice and 
are not a priori infrastructure. In other words, nothing 
is per se infrastructure, but everything can become 
infrastructure when it adopts infrastructural properties. 
The perspective of when—not what—is an 
infrastructure is also in line with recent work on digital 
infrastructures as Constantinides, et al. [13] noted that 
“smartphones are powerful computational and 
networking devices serving as infrastructures once 
they scale to a critical mass” (italic added by the 
authors). With the relational concept in mind, 
infrastructures, independent of whether they transfer 
physical or digital material, emerge to have the 
following properties: 
1. Embeddedness: Infrastructure is composed of 
and sunk into other structures, arrangements, 
capabilities, and technologies [14, 16]. 
2. Recursively organized: Infrastructure shapes 
and is shaped by a community of practice; it is 
both an outcome and a condition of action [14, 
16, 18]. 
3. Transparency: “Infrastructure is transparent to 
use in the sense that it does not have to be 
reinvented each time or assembled for each task, 
but invisibly supports those tasks” [16]. 
4. Large reach or scope: Infrastructure is 
ubiquitous, widely accessible, and supports 
many users [14, 16, 19, 20]. 
5. Taken-for-grantedness: Infrastructure is taken 
for granted in the sense that outsiders view 
infrastructure as an object that they need to learn 
about to become a member of a community of 
practice [16, 19]. 
6. Interoperability: Infrastructure is interoperable 
as it leverages standards and thus takes an 
invisible stance [16, 19]. 
7. Visibility upon breakdown: Infrastructure is 
usually invisible. When it breaks down, it 
becomes a visible object [16, 19]. 
8. Installed base inertia: Infrastructure does not 
grow de novo; its evolution is both enabled and 
constrained by the installed base (its current 
configuration of components) [14, 16]. 
9. Resolution of local and global tension: “An 
infrastructure occurs when the tension between 
local and global is resolved. That is, an 
infrastructure occurs when local practices are 
afforded by a larger-scale technology, which can 
then be used in a natural, ready-to-hand fashion” 
[16]. 
10. Distributed control: Control over infrastructure 
is distributed and dynamically negotiated [14, 
19]. 
11. Regulated in public interest: Infrastructure is 
“administratively regulated in public interest; 
sometimes private or public monopoly” [19]. 
2.2 Properties of Digital Platforms 
Moving from infrastructural properties to 
platform properties, we argue that digital platforms 
operate on top of digital infrastructures and define 
them as “a set of digital resources—including services 
and content—that enable value-creating interactions 
between external producers and consumers” [13]. 
Further, we argue that, identical to infrastructure, 
digital platforms need to be viewed from a relational 
perspective. Things emerge to be digital platforms and 
are not a priori digital platforms. For instance, Apple’s 
mobile operating system is not a digital platform per 
se, but it has become one by opening up to external 
producers [21]. 
Recent literature has further specified the concept 
of digital platforms due to different economic and 
strategic logics. For example, Cennamo [22] 
distinguished three types of digital platforms: (1) 
multisided transaction, (2) complementary innovation, 
and (3) information platforms. Multisided transaction 
platforms refer to digital platforms that connect 
transactions across different market sides (e.g., 
Amazon Marketplace). Meanwhile, complementary 
innovation platforms relate to digital platforms 
facilitating complementary innovation and offering 
integrated solutions to consumers (e.g., Google 
Android). Lastly, information platforms refer to digital 
platforms that simplify information search and 
exchanges (e.g., Facebook). 
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Although different types of digital platforms exist 
[23], they largely emerged to share the following 
properties: 
1. Third-party development and orchestration: 
Platforms are open to external producers and 
orchestrate producers’ complements to enhance 
the platform’s functionality and capability [24]. 
2. Connection of heterogeneous user groups: 
Platforms facilitate interactions between distinct 
groups that would otherwise have difficulty 
finding each other [14, 25]. 
3. Modularity: Platforms are modular in the sense 
that they use boundary resources between 
platform core and complementary components 
[26]. 
4. Affordances and constraints: Platforms 
provide boundary resources such as software 
development kits to increase its digital 
affordances, where affordances represent 
opportunities for complementors to co-create 
value-adding complements [27]. Platforms 
simultaneously constrain complementors and 
channel them toward the interests of the platform 
owner [19]. 
5. Network effects. Platform users gain value by 
other users joining the platform [22, 23]. 
Network effects can manifest within one side of 
the platform (e.g., the more consumers join an e-
commerce platform the more reviews available) 
and across platform sides (e.g., the more 
developers join a mobile platform the more apps 
are available to consumers). 
6. Generativity: Platforms leverage ecosystems’ 
generativity so that complementors can actualize 
digital affordances to develop unforeseeable 
functionalities beyond the platform owners’ 
capabilities [28]. 
7. Centralized control: Control over the platforms 
is centralized, and rules are unilaterally imposed 
by the platform owner. 
8. Regulated through competition: Platforms are 
regulated by common legal frameworks, such as 
antitrust and intellectual property; they do not 
serve the public interest [19]. 
 
To summarize, infrastructures, especially digital 
infrastructures, and digital platforms are not perfectly 
distinguishable; they have some overlapping 
characteristics. Hence, some authors argue that digital 
platforms are a less complex subtype of digital 
infrastructure with more centralized control 
mechanisms [14, 29]. However, infrastructures and 
digital platforms differ in scale and scope [19]. 
Infrastructures integrate various social and technical 
components on a large scale through interoperability 
and decentralized control. Most infrastructures are 
widely accessible, taken for granted, and transparent 
in use. In addition, governments strictly regulate some 
infrastructures. Digital platforms are generally of 
smaller scales and scopes. Platform owners leverage a 
modular design through which they enjoy a plethora 
of third-party components without forfeiting control 
over the platform. Digital platforms serve the interest 
of the platform owner and not public interests, and are 
not specifically regulated by governments. 
2.3 Essentiality 
The concept of essentiality has its roots in the 
essential facility doctrine, which relates to the 
framework of refusal to deal and requires monopolists 
to share facilities essential to competition with rivals 
[30, 31]. Therefore, essentiality refers to a facility or 
input that is indispensable for competition. 
The economic concept indicates that essentiality 
is relational. That is, nothing is per se essential; 
something (facility or input) is perceived as essential 
by someone (rivals) for the purpose of something 
(competition). This corresponds to prior work on 
essential data by Colangelo and Maggiolino [30] who 
also added another critical aspect: “a resource is not 
essential as such; it is essential in relation to 
‘something’ and in comparison with the other inputs 
that can be used in relation to that ‘something’ ” (italic 
added by the authors). Hence, an essential resource 
also needs to be viewed in relation to an alternative 
resource. For example, some consumers will probably 
perceive a car as more essential than a bicycle 
compared to a scooter when their goal is to get to a 
distant place. This means that an essential resource 
should be compared to a viable alternative instead of 
any alternative to derive meaningful insights of 
whether the resource is indeed perceived as essential. 
We argue that an “alternative” represents any given 
choice or possible solution for a specific need, whereas 
a “viable alternative” represents a feasible or realistic 
choice or solution for that need. If someone believes 
that no viable alternative exists compared to the 
resource of interest, we argue that the resource is 
perceived as essential. However, this does not 
demonstrate that the resource is objectively essential 
or that others share this perspective. The idea of a 
viable alternative strongly matters on what someone 
believes is a viable alternative. We argue that “viable” 
in the context of digital platforms is a matter of 
substitutability, switching costs, and multihoming 
costs. 
Substitutes are defined as interrelated goods in the 
sense that an increase in the price of a good will 
increase demands for its substitutes. More generally, 
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substitutes represent goods that can replace each other 
in use (or consumption) as they satisfy the same needs 
and correspond in various characteristics such as price, 
quality, performance, and effort to use. Switching 
costs are defined as the costs that consumers face to 
change between substitute products [32, 33]. 
Switching costs result, for instance, from network 
effects, learning, and data portability. Lastly, 
multihoming costs describe the sum of costs that users 
must invest for their participation in more than one 
platform (e.g., operation and opportunity costs) [34]. 
We propose that a viable alternative represents a 
substitute to the resource of interest and requires low 
switching or multihoming costs. For instance, an Uber 
rider probably perceives Lyft as a viable alternative 
because Lyft satisfies the same need (on-demand 
mobility), corresponds in various characteristics (e.g., 
price), and requires low switching costs (e.g., low 
learning costs and sufficient drivers available) or 
multihoming costs (e.g., similar operational costs as 
single homing). In contrast, users of messaging 
applications (e.g., WhatsApp) might argue that 
alternatives such as Telegram or Signal do not 
represent viable alternatives. Although these 
alternatives satisfy the same need (messaging), 
correspond in various characteristics (e.g., 
functionality), and require low multihoming costs 
(e.g., low costs of maintaining two profiles), they 
require high switching costs (e.g., loss of personal 
network). Hence, Uber riders might argue that Uber is 
not essential, whereas WhatsApp might be generally 
perceived as essential by its users. 
To summarize, we view essentiality as a relational 
concept defined as the perception of someone that no 
viable alternative exists to the resource of interest to 
reach a specific objective. 
2.4 Abuse of Power and Regulation  
The concept of abuse of power is rooted in 
competition law and used by Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union as follows: 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the internal market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it 
may affect trade between Member States.” Abusive 
behavior includes practices such as predatory pricing, 
exclusive dealing, refusal to supply, and tying. 
Although this narrow concept of abuse of power is 
well suited for competition analysis, we take a broader 
perspective to account for other public interests such 
as consumer interests (e.g., privacy law), freedom 
from improper influence (e.g., labor law), as well as 
integrity and continuity (e.g., of platforms that are 
used by other platforms) (see Nooren, et al. [35] for a 
discussion of the four types of public interests in the 
platform economy). Hence, our understanding of 
abuse of power is not restricted to the abuse of market 
power that results from a dominant position. We view 
power more generally in the sense that “power has to 
do with relationships between two or more actors in 
which the behavior of one is affected by the behavior 
of the other” (Hall 1999, p. 110, as cited in Jasperson, 
et al. [36]). This conceptualization of power allows us 
to acknowledge abuse of power outside of competition 
law and to recognize its occurrence in other legal 
domains. 
Having conceptualized abuse of power outside of 
competition law suits the concept of regulation. That 
is because in the European Union competition 
enforcement and regulation differ in their rationale and 
approach. While competition enforcement punishes 
anti-competitive behavior ex-post, regulation prevents 
abusive behavior ex-ante whereby it is not limited to 
competition objectives. Regulation can promote 
various (possibly contradicting) objectives such as 
effective competition, users’ interests, and 
environmental standards. Moreover, regulation 
applies common rules to specific issues whereas 
competition enforcement is concerned with case-by-
case analyses. Regulation is usually sector-specific 
although sometimes it can apply to multiple sectors. In 
contrast, competition enforcement is per se horizontal 
and cross-sectoral [37]. 
 
Table 1: Summary of key terms 
Term Definition Examples 
Digital 
Platform 
“[…] a set of digital 
resources—including 
services and content—that 
enable value-creating 
interactions between 







 “[…] the computing and 
network resources that allow 
multiple stakeholders to 
orchestrate their service and 
content needs” [13]. 
Internet, data 
centers, and open 
standards (e.g., 
USB and TCP) 
Viable 
Alternative 
A substitute to the resource 
of interest that requires low 
switching or multihoming 
costs. 
For a map-based 
app a developer 
perceives Google 
Maps as more 





Essentiality The perception of someone 
that no viable alternative 
exists to the resource of 




The act of one actor using its 
power to negatively 






Regulation “Regulation ‘limits’ or 
corrects markets with 
interventions to achieve a set 
policy goal” [37]. 
Prohibiting the use 
of own in-app 
purchase system.  
3. Toward a Framework of Essential 
Platform Infrastructure 
Having outlined the theoretical foundations of 
infrastructures, digital platforms, and essentiality, we 
theorize their intersections intending to build a Venn 
diagram for essential platform infrastructure. 
3.1 Infrastructuralized Platforms 
The idea that infrastructures and digital platforms 
overlap is particularly evident when looking at large 
platform operators such as Google or Apple. Some of 
the platforms that these companies operate indeed 
indicate both infrastructure and platform properties 
(e.g., iOS and Android). However, not all platforms 
have infrastructural properties. Most industrial 
internet of things platforms, for example, serve a 
narrow use case (small scope) and are used by small 
numbers of users (small scale). To reflect the process 
of platforms obtaining infrastructural properties, we 
follow Plantin, et al. [19], Helmond, et al. [38], and de 
Reuver, et al. [29] and term these platforms 
infrastructuralized platforms. Such platforms are for 
instance the WeChat platform [20], the Facebook 
platform [19, 29, 38], and the Google Maps platform 
[39]. 
All three have grown into a ubiquitous state, 
became widely accessible, accumulated huge user 
numbers, and developed into foundations of multiple 
use cases. The three platforms also became widely 
embedded in other systems and applications. For 
example, online shopping platforms use Facebook’s 
marketing API and authentication API, mobility 
service providers use the Google Maps API, and 
financial transactions are often conducted via WeChat 
in China. Furthermore, the platforms evolved into 
being taken for granted by consumers and developers 
in the sense that they view these platforms as an object 
they need to learn about to engage in their community 
of practice. The three platforms are also transparent to 
use as they invisibly support various tasks (which is 
even more prevalent for consumers than developers) 
without the need to be reinvented each time and would 
become visible upon breakdown. 
2.2 Platform Essentiality 
Platform essentiality draws on the relational 
concept of essentiality and is concerned with the 
essentiality of one specific platform (e.g., iOS or 
Android) as perceived by its users. For instance, by 
consumers, app developers, and device manufacturers 
in the case of a mobile platform. Hence, this 
perspective assumes that essentiality is dynamic and 
relational, and that it can only be assessed through 
subjective measures and an interpretivist stance. A 
platform is not per se essential; it becomes essential 
when someone perceives that no viable alternative 
exists to reach a specific objective. This implies that a 
platform can be perceived as essential for multiple 
objectives and that those objectives differ within and 
especially across user sides. 
For example, Facebook’s essentiality can be 
assessed by consumers and businesses. Both have 
different objectives with Facebook: consumers aim to 
interact with friends, whereas businesses aim to 
interact with customers and advertise their products. 
Consequently, consumers might argue that other social 
media platforms that support the objective of 
interacting with friends do not represent a viable 
alternative because they are not a good substitute for 
that objective or exhibit high switching and 
multihoming costs. Consumers might argue that 
alternative platforms do not offer the same variety of 
features (messaging, posting, video calling, gaming, 
and live streaming), do not cover as many friends as 
Facebook, and profiles as well as posts are costly to 
keep up to date on both platforms. Hence, although 
other social media platforms represent alternatives, 
they might not represent viable alternatives due to 
their lack of offering a holistic interaction experience 
(substitutability), connecting the same number of 
friends (switching costs), or reducing recurring tasks 
(multihoming costs), indicating that Facebook has 
become essential to interact with friends. 
However, when taking the business perspective, 
businesses might compare Facebook to two different 
types of alternatives: alternatives that support 
customer interaction (e.g., email, a chatbot on the 
website, or other social media platforms) and 
alternative advertisement platforms (e.g., Google Ads, 
Amazon Ads, or LinkedIn Ads). Businesses might 
argue that alternative services for customer interaction 
represent viable alternatives because alternatives offer 
similar functionalities, similar access to customers, 
and require low switching or multihoming costs. This 
indicates that Facebook has not become essential for 
businesses to interact with customers. Regarding 
advertisement, businesses might argue that alternative 
advertisement platforms do not leverage similar social 
information (e.g., political opinion, cultural 
background, or emotional state) about their users to 
offer a substitutable quality in personalized 
advertisement to Facebook. This indicates that 
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Facebook has become essential for advertising goods 
even though switching and multihoming costs might 
be low. 
Furthermore, even platforms of the same service 
domain are not equally essential just because they 
operate in the same domain. For example, both 
Apple’s and Google’s mobile app platforms reside in 
the operating system (iOS and Android) and app 
distribution (App Store and Play Store) domain. In 
general, app developers might perceive both platforms 
as equally essential for running and distributing their 
app since consumers usually single home. Hence, if 
app developers want to reach out to all consumers it is 
essential for them to offer their app on both platforms. 
However, if an app specifically serves the needs of 
emerging markets (e.g., mobility app in India), app 
developers would probably support our claim that 
Google’s platform will be more essential than Apple’s 
platform. This is because iOS is largely associated 
with consumers stemming from developed countries 
having higher income and higher education, whereas 
Android is also prevalent in developing countries. 
Hence, Android is more essential than iOS if the 
objective of the app developer is to distribute the app 
in emerging markets. Both the general and the specific 
scenario illustrate our argument that platforms in the 
same domain are perceived as differently essential 
depending on the user itself, the purpose for which the 
platform is used, and the alternatives to which the 
platform is compared. 
2.3 Essential Platform Infrastructure 
Essential platform infrastructures represent 
platforms that have obtained infrastructural properties 
and are perceived by their users as essential. In 
general, this type refers to digital platforms that are 
large in scale and scope, and perceived to compete 
against no viable alternative. For example, the 
Android platform is embedded into different 
smartphones, reaches billions of users, is taken for 
granted, supports various use cases, and is perceived 
as essential compared to the iOS platform by app 
developers to reach users in emerging markets. We 
propose to differentiate essential platform 
infrastructures from basic platforms, essential 
platforms, and infrastructuralized platforms. Figure 1 
shows the four types of digital platforms resulting 
from a Venn diagram on essentiality, platform 
properties, and infrastructural properties. 
 
Figure 1: Four types of digital platforms 
Basic platforms are digital platforms that are 
neither perceived as essential by their users nor have 
they obtained infrastructural properties. In general, 
this type refers to platforms that are small in scale and 
scope, and perceived to compete against viable 
alternatives. 
Essential platforms are digital platforms that are 
perceived as essential by their users but who have not 
obtained infrastructural properties. In general, this 
type refers to platforms that are small in scale and 
scope, and perceived to compete against no viable 
alternative. For example, industrial internet of things 
platforms are used by a small number of users, support 
specific use cases, and likely to be perceived as 
essential by its users for that use case. 
Lastly, infrastructuralized platforms are digital 
platforms that are not perceived as essential by their 
users, but have obtained infrastructural properties. In 
general, this type refers to platforms that are large in 
scale and scope, and perceived to compete against 
viable alternatives. Cloud platforms, such as Dropbox, 
reach millions of users and are visible upon 
breakdown, but they are not essential to consumers 
because they can easily switch to a viable alternative. 
4. Essential Platform Infrastructure and 
the Need for Regulation 
To address abuse of power in the platform 
economy, researchers and regulators emphasize the 
necessity of platform regulation. A recurring challenge 
within that debate is the definition of which platforms 
should fall under regulation and which should not. We 
argue that platform essentiality and infrastructural 
properties are two suitable concepts to derive the need 
for regulation. Platform essentiality, defined as the 
perception that no viable alternatives exist compared 
to the platform of interest to reach a specific objective, 
functions as an indicator of platform power – the 
ability to act independently from competitors, 
complementors, and consumer preferences. Platform 
power gives organizations the ability to engage in 















platform power can therefore abuse power without 
losing customers or complementors to competitors. 
According to our definition, we argue that total 
platform power represents the case in which all users 
perceive a platform as essential for all objectives. This 
means that the more essential a platform becomes; the 
less viable alternatives exist for users to switch to. As 
a result, the platform can act more independently and 
can more easily abuse its power because users are 
unwilling or even unable to abandon the platform. 
In contrast, infrastructural properties indicate the 
number of entities and sectors affected by a potential 
abuse of power. By entities we understand both human 
users and technical systems, and by sector we 
understand different service types, markets, industries, 
or more generally use cases. As a platform develops 
infrastructural properties, it increases its scale and 
scope and becomes taken for granted and widely 
accessible by various entities. On one extreme, the 
platform becomes a de-facto standard for multiple user 
groups and use cases. It has sunk into the background 
and turned invisible to the community of practice. 
Moreover, the platform achieved to afford local 
practices by a larger-scale technology and therefore 
became a complete infrastructure. On the other end of 
the spectrum, the platform supports a small number of 
users and use cases. Thus, it has not become 
ubiquitous, is largely visible before breakdown, and 
only embedded to a small extent. This type of platform 
cannot be considered an infrastructure because it has 
not obtained infrastructural properties. Hence, the 
more a platform develops infrastructural properties, 
the more it can be considered a complete infrastructure 
and thereby the larger its potential damage in case of 
abuse of power. Both dimensions, that is, platform 
power as well as number of entities and sectors 
affected, indicate the magnitude of potential damage. 
The higher the magnitude of the potential damage, the 
higher the need for regulation (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Essential platform infrastructure 
and the need for regulation 
It should be noted that “platform power” and 
“number of entities and sectors affected” are part of a 
larger model to assess the need for regulation. We 
argue that the need for regulation is the product of the 
likelihood of abuse and the severity of abuse. 
The likelihood of abuse is determined by platform 
power and the willingness to abuse power. Just 
holding significant power and thereby being able to 
abuse power does not implicate that power will be 
actually abused. However, willingness to abuse power 
is difficult to measure. It might be approximated by 
looking at past behavior in the sense that an 
organization that has already abused its power in the 
past might be more willing to abuse its power in the 
future. Although this approach might yield reasonable 
predictions for platform organizations with records of 
past behavior, it is not applicable to new platform 
organizations and does not account for behavioral 
change. For those reasons, willingness to abuse power 
is excluded from the proposed model to assess the 
need for regulation. 
For the severity of abuse, we argue that it is 
determined by the intensity of abuse and the number 
of entities and sectors affected. The intensity of abuse 
thereby represents how strongly a platform is abusing 
its power. We would argue that, for example, biasing 
recommendations toward own downstream services is 
less intense than biasing recommendations and 
demoting rival services. However, the intensity of 
abuse can only be determined ex-post. Consequently, 
the concept is not suitable for the objective of 
establishing or even predicting the importance of a 
new platform of investigation a priori. 
5. Theoretical and Practical Implications 
The proposed concept of essential platform 
infrastructure makes three contributions to theory. 
First, it contributes to the debate of differentiating 
digital platforms and digital infrastructures. Some 
authors argue that digital platforms operate on top of 
digital infrastructures [13], while others argue that 
digital platforms are a less complex subtype of digital 
infrastructures with more centralized control 
mechanisms [14, 29]. Essential platform infrastructure 
bridges both perspectives by taking a relational 
perspective and drawing on the work that digital 
platforms and digital infrastructures emerge along 
certain properties [16, 19]. As a result, digital 
platforms and digital infrastructures can sometimes 
refer to the same artefact. However, they can also 
exhibit more or less properties of one another or they 
can be completely distinct. Allowing the free 
combination of properties thereby resolves the issue of 









































digital infrastructure and acknowledges that certain 
mixtures of both exist as well. 
Second, the concept of essential platform 
infrastructure contributes to the refinement of the 
concept of essentiality. While prior work emphasized 
that it is critical to assess a resource in comparison to 
something to derive its essentiality [30, 31], it does not 
provide clear guidance to what exactly the resource 
should be compared. We propose to compare the 
resource of interest to a viable alternative instead of 
just any alternative to derive meaningful insights of 
whether the resource is indeed perceived as essential. 
We argue that a viable alternative represents a 
substitute to the resource of interest and requires low 
switching or multihoming costs. 
Third, essential platform infrastructure also 
contributes to the contextualization of essentiality to 
the domain of digital platforms. We propose that 
platform essentiality describes that platforms are not 
per se essential; they become essential when someone 
perceives that no viable alternative exists to reach a 
specific objective with that platform. Consequently, 
platform essentiality represents a new construct for the 
platform literature and can help explain user behavior 
on platforms. For instance, platform essentiality may 
predict developer contribution behavior such as 
developing a new app, updating an existing app, 
willingness to advocate the platform, or willingness to 
switch. 
The proposed framework of essential platform 
infrastructure and the need for regulation contributes 
to regulatory practice. The framework supports 
regulators in identifying which platforms exhibit a 
significant magnitude of potential damage in case of 
abuse of power and therefore should fall under 
regulation. As a next step, regulators can assess which 
obligations and prohibitions are suitable to support 
which policy goal and whether these regulations 
should apply horizontally or sector-specific. 
6. Avenues for Future Research 
Our concept of essential platform infrastructure 
offers a complementary approach to address the 
challenge of defining digital platforms worthy of 
regulation. However, the proposed concept is limited 
by its theoretical and abstract nature and thus gives rise 
to various avenues for future research. 
First, we encourage future research to refine the 
concept of platform essentiality and develop 
appropriate constructs. Although this paper puts 
forward a high-level definition of platform 
essentiality, future research needs to identify the 
underlying dimensions based on which a platform’s 
degree of essentiality should be assessed. Hence, 
empirical work is needed to understand which 
objectives are pursued with a platform by which type 
of users and which aspects among those objectives 
matter for essentiality. For instance, app developers 
might find software platforms, such as Android or 
iOS, relevant for three objectives: creating, 
distributing, and monetizing their app. For each 
objective, future research can investigate which 
underlying aspects matter for essentiality. For 
instance, for value creation, the essential aspects could 
be development tools or APIs, whereas for value 
capture, this might be the app marketplace and the 
billing system. For each aspect, future research can 
further derive the criteria based on which the platform 
of interest should be compared vis-à-vis potential 
viable alternatives. For example, to assess the 
essentiality of a platform’s APIs, developers could be 
asked to indicate the availability, functionality, or 
integration effort compared to APIs of alternative 
platforms. Such granular contextualization will 
contribute more nuanced knowledge to the concept of 
platform essentiality. However, operationalizing 
platform essentiality for each digital platform is 
challenging and not optimal for regulators with limited 
resources. Hence, future research can examine 
whether certain objectives and aspects of platform 
essentiality remain constant across platform types 
such as innovation and transaction platforms [40]. For 
instance, mobile app platforms and internet of things 
platforms might both reveal that developers aim to 
pursue value creation, distribution, and capture with 
these platforms. 
Second, future research is encouraged to explore 
the thresholds for when a platform should be 
considered essential and how different thresholds 
inform regulatory practice. For instance, is a platform 
essential once the majority of one user side indicates 
that the platform has become essential to them, should 
both sides indicate platform essentiality, or might it be 
sufficient if a certain percentage of users indicate 
platform essentiality? Depending on which thresholds, 
or combinations of thresholds, are used, future 
research needs to reveal how this impacts regulatory 
practice. For example, if one user side is sufficient to 
indicate platform essentiality, this can largely reduce 
regulatory effort. However, this also bears the risk that 
regulations are set in place which favor one user side 
over the other side(s) of the platform. 
Third, taking a more high-level and less user-
centric perspective into account, future research can 
employ the framework of essential platform 
infrastructure and the need for regulation (Figure 2) to 
conduct classification workshops with regulators. 
During these workshops, regulators could classify 
platforms into the four types of basic platforms, 
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essential platforms, infrastructuralized platforms, and 
essential platform infrastructures. This approach will 
help future research to identify essential platform 
infrastructures and to reveal the differentiating factors 
between each platform type. Compared to the 
approach in which users indicate the degree of 
essentiality of each platform, this high-level, 
regulator-centric approach can lead to quicker but 
probably less informed results.  
Fourth, building on the regulator-centric 
approach, future research might engage in design 
science research to turn the proposed framework 
(Figure 2) from a simple 2-by-2 matrix into an 
interactive IT artifact with metrics, benchmarks, and 
visualizations. It could provide an engaging and easy‐
to‐use tool that presents regulators with a real-time 
topology of the digital platform landscape with 
recommendations on which platforms might develop 
into essential platform infrastructures in the near 
future. 
Fifth, after having identified essential platform 
infrastructures, future research is encouraged to assess 
which kind of regulations should be adopted and 
whether they should apply horizontally or sector-
specific. It will be critical to discuss which policy goal 
to prioritize and to determine the extent of regulatory 
intervention (e.g., transparency and reporting 
obligations versus structural remedies). 
Lastly, we encourage future research to engage 
with the central theme of how the EU can catch up in 
global tech leadership to sustain its digital sovereignty 
[e.g., 41, 42]. While the proposed framework guides 
EU regulators to make efficient use of their resources 
to scrutinize relevant platforms, this only represents 
one side of catching up in tech leadership. The other 
side covers the option of helping EU regulators and 
policy-makers to foster the development of essential 
platform infrastructures made in the EU. To this end, 
future research can explore the optimal degree of 
regulation and self-developed essential platform 
infrastructures as well as the overarching questions of 
whether and especially how the EU can build its own 
viable alternatives. 
7. Conclusion 
The regulation of digital platforms has recently 
received increased attention from research and 
practice. This is because large platform providers, 
such as Google, Apple, and Facebook, are more and 
more abusing their power [3-7]. To address abuse of 
power, current debates discuss the application of 
regulations that should impose certain obligations or 
prohibitions on specific platforms and regulate their 
behavior a priori [11]. A recurring challenge within 
that debate is the definition of which platforms should 
fall under regulation and which should not. To this 
end, we propose the concept of essential platform 
infrastructure which represents digital platforms that 
have obtained infrastructural properties (e.g., large 
reach, large scope, and taken for granted) and are 
perceived by its users as essential. Essentiality thereby 
refers to the perception of users that no viable 
alternative exists to the platform of interest to reach a 
specific objective. Once a digital platform has 
achieved this status, we argue that it should fall under 
regulation because it has obtained significant power 
and affects a variety of entities and sectors. As a result, 
such a platform exhibits a significant magnitude of 
potential damage compared to less powerful and 
smaller digital platforms. Our framework contributes 
to regulatory practice by helping regulators to cope 
with their limited resources by focusing on digital 
platforms that matter. It also contributes to research on 
platform regulation. 
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